Category Archives: Immigration

Immigration: 1880-1920

For much of American history, immigration worked very differently than it does today. Between 1880 and 1920, tens of millions of immigrants arrived in the United States during an era with few numerical limits on immigration. Who came, why were they welcomed—or opposed—and what eventually caused America to begin closing the door?

The Barn

What was our immigration policy in the late 1800s ?

The Mack

The easiest way to understand U.S. immigration from 1880 onward is as a series of fairly distinct eras. And one striking feature is that the immigration system we have today is quite different from the one the country had for most of the 20th century.

Around 1900, the United States was in the middle of one of history’s great migrations.

Between roughly 1880 and 1920, millions arrived, increasingly from Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Poland and other parts of southern and eastern Europe, rather than the northern and western European countries that had supplied many earlier immigrants.

Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free

There was no general numerical ceiling on European immigration. If an immigrant arrived, passed inspection, wasn’t considered likely to become a public charge, didn’t have certain diseases or criminal problems, and wasn’t otherwise in an excluded category, he or she could generally enter.

But it wasn’t completely open immigration. The federal government had already begun excluding particular groups:

  • The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 essentially stopped Chinese labor immigration.
  • Contract labor laws restricted importing foreign workers under certain employment arrangements.
  • Anarchists, people with certain diseases, prostitutes and some other categories could be excluded.
  • Immigration officials could reject someone considered “likely to become a public charge.”

Mexico and Canada were comparatively unrestricted.

The Barn

Tell me a little more about the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882

The Mack

It was the first major federal immigration law to exclude people principally on the basis of nationality and class, and it helped establish the federal government’s modern role in controlling immigration

Large-scale Chinese immigration began after the California Gold Rush and accelerated with construction of the western railroads. Thousands of Chinese laborers worked on the Central Pacific portion of the transcontinental railroad and later in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, laundries and other businesses.

The Chinese population in the United States grew from about 35,600 in 1860 to 105,600 in 1880. 

By 1880 there were roughly 105,000 Chinese-born people in the United States, overwhelmingly in the West. That was actually a tiny fraction of the national population, but the concentration in California made their presence much more conspicuous.

Economic competition became intertwined with overt racial hostility. Chinese workers were accused of depressing wages and taking jobs from white workers. Labor organizations became particularly important proponents of exclusion.

The Barn

Why did Chinese workers come to California in such numbers in the first place?

The Mack

The first big attraction was the California Gold Rush after 1848. Conditions in southern China also pushed migration: poverty, political turmoil and warfare, while California offered wages enormously higher than those available at home. Many migrants were young men who viewed America—Gam Saan, the “Gold Mountain”—as a place to earn money and eventually return to China.

After the Gold Rush came the trans-continental railroad.

Chinese worked for $30 per month; white Europeans received $35 per month plus room and board… big savings for Central Pacific RR

The railroad didn’t initially hire Chinese workers because it preferred Chinese people. It hired them because it needed labor. Once employers discovered that the workers were productive and comparatively inexpensive, they wanted more of them. 

Charles Crocker, Central Pacific RR

Central Pacific desperately needed labor in 1865—it had work for perhaps 4,000 men but could retain only around 800. Crocker pushed the idea of trying Chinese labor despite strong objections from construction superintendent James Strobridge. They started with about 50 Chinese workers. Their performance changed management’s opinion dramatically, and eventually Chinese workers constituted perhaps 80% of Central Pacific’s construction workforce. Crocker later recalled that when they needed something done quickly, they learned it was often better to put Chinese crews on it. 

Eventually, about 11,000 Chinese workers were working on the Central Pacific by 1868. The company’s attitude changed dramatically. Chinese workers acquired a reputation among Central Pacific management for being reliable, efficient and remarkably capable workers.

The Big Four of the Central Pacific Railroad

The Barn

What did Chinese immigration do to the American labor market?

The Mack

A couple things. So the nominal wage difference—$30 versus $35—understates the real disparity. The National Park Service estimates Chinese workers’ overall compensation was about 30% lower than European and European-American workers once the different treatment is taken into account.

The disparity was maintained by a familiar tactic, used throughout our history… busting the workers’ strike.

Crocker and the Central Pacific cut off supplies to the Chinese to force them to drop their demands and return to work

Secondly, the Chinese experience suggests something much more interesting: immigrant labor can simultaneously compete with some American workers, complement others, lower employers’ costs, increase production and create additional jobs elsewhere in the economy. If you remove that labor, you have to trace ALL of those effects—not merely count the job that the immigrant previously occupied. 

Next up…

1917–1924: America closes the door

World War I, nationalism, labor concerns and fears about the enormous immigration wave changed the political climate. This brought on the biggest immigration-policy reversal in 

The Chinese Problem

Fourteen Years: 1868-1882

In just fourteen years, the United States went from encouraging Chinese immigration under the Burlingame-Seward Treaty to restricting it with the Chinese Exclusion Act. What happened between 1868 and 1882?

The Barn

Let’s talk about the “Chinese Problem.” By 1869, the Central Pacific’s Chinese workforce had grown to 11,000, which was 80 percent of the CP workforce. The Central Pacific was in a big rush to lay tracks, weren’t they?

The Mack

Right, the transcontinental railroad would be completed when the Central Pacific met the Union Pacific at Promontory Summit, Utah, on May 10, 1869. And those miles of track were a very lucrative endeavor for the Central Pacific and the Big Four… Crocker, Hopkins, Stanford, and Huntington.

Punching a hole for the Central Pacific RR at Donner Pass

The Central Pacific began seriously experimenting with Chinese laborers in 1865, initially hiring a relatively small group because Charles Crocker and the other Central Pacific leaders were having great difficulty recruiting and retaining enough white workers in California. The Chinese workers proved effective, and the experiment expanded rapidly.

And there’s an important irony that connects directly with what we’ve been calling the “Chinese Problem.” The Chinese workers went from being a labor force that many Central Pacific managers initially doubted could do railroad construction to being indispensable to completing one of the country’s most celebrated national projects. Yet almost immediately afterward, Chinese immigration and Chinese workers increasingly became characterized in California politics as a social and economic “problem.”

The Barn

What did the Burlingame-Seward Treaty establish between China and the United States? And when was the treaty ratified?

The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, ratified November 1869

The Mack

The Burlingame–Seward Treaty was negotiated and signed in Washington, D.C., on July 28, 1868, and ratifications were exchanged on November 23, 1869. 

The treaty was negotiated by Anson Burlingame, representing China, and Secretary of State William H. Seward for the United States. Crucially, it recognized the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance” and encouraged voluntary migration between China and the United States. 

Anson Burlingame, representing Chinese interests

So at almost exactly the moment the Chinese railroad workforce was demonstrating its enormous economic value, the official policy of the United States was actually moving toward freer Chinese immigration—not exclusion.

William Seward, U.S. Secretary of State

The bargain was essentially reciprocal:

Americans could travel, reside, trade and pursue opportunities in China; Chinese could travel and reside in the United States.

Seward’s great foreign-policy objective was American access to China—a potentially enormous market. The United States was competing with Britain and the other European powers for trade and influence there. The State Department’s own historical account describes American objectives as gaining access to profitable Asian trade and increasing American influence in China.

But there was another reason that is especially pertinent to our conversation.

Washington actually wanted more Chinese labor

The State Department’s history says explicitly that the treaty ensured a continuing supply of inexpensive Chinese immigrant labor for American businesses and that American industrial leaders initially celebrated it for precisely that reason.

Angel Island arrivals bound for San Francisco, notoriously more exclusionary than Ellis Island on the other coast

Even more strikingly, when the treaty was still awaiting Chinese ratification, the new Grant administration’s Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, actively pushed for ratification. A later State Department diplomatic history records Fish welcoming Chinese laborers coming by the “thousands” and predicting that their movement eastward would “continue and increase.” 

The thinking wasn’t:

We needed 11,000 Chinese to build the Central Pacific.

It was closer to:

Chinese labor helped build the Central Pacific. Why shouldn’t Chinese labor help build the rest of the American economy?

The Barn

So in 1869 when the treaty was ratified, there were already two very different American views of Chinese immigration?

The Mack

Yes. California had experienced anti-Chinese agitation since the 1850s. An 1868 federal report describes California politicians trying to restrict Chinese immigration while merchants, manufacturers and capitalists argued that Chinese labor and the China trade were extremely important to the state’s economy. 

Meanwhile, the national government was looking westward across the Pacific and seeing something different:

China = trade + markets + diplomatic influence + labor.

So Washington ratified a treaty guaranteeing essentially free voluntary migration at almost precisely the moment when the particular labor shortage that had made Chinese workers indispensable to the Central Pacific Railroad was disappearing.

The Barn

It sounds to me like the Chinese Problem boils down to employers versus laborers.

The Mack

Yes, and I think that’s a cleaner way of understanding the early conflict than starting with racism alone. 

A remarkable 1868 federal report from California practically says this explicitly. It describes a large and influential group of “merchants, manufacturers, capitalists” who valued Chinese labor and trade. It then describes white laborers objecting because Chinese workers supplied the labor market and frustrated workers’ attempts to control the price of labor. The author even states the economic conflict plainly: workers naturally try to obtain as much as possible for their labor, while “capitalists should endeavor to cheapen labor as much as they can.” 

So by 1869 you can reasonably picture two economic interests:

Employers/capital: California needs workers. Chinese labor is reliable, relatively inexpensive, and expands what we can build, manufacture, mine and grow.

White labor: The Chinese willingness to work for less increases the supply of labor, weakens our bargaining power, and makes it harder for us to demand higher wages.

The Barn

The Burlingame-Seward Treaty opened the gate and the Chinese Exclusion Act slammed it shut, and in the intervening 14 years around 200,000 Chinese arrived in the United States. How did our national government so thoroughly and completely change their attitude during that span? What happened?

The Mack

Initially, the Burlingame-Seward Treaty reflected a remarkably optimistic national view. Washington wanted commerce with China, good relations with the Qing government, and access to Chinese labor. 

The railroad had demonstrated that Chinese workers were reliable and productive. Once it was finished, Chinese labor didn’t disappear. Workers moved into agriculture, mining, factories, construction, laundries, domestic service and additional railroad building throughout the West. 

But then came the Panic of 1873 and the long economic depression that followed.

Unemployment rose. Wages came under pressure. And suddenly the Chinese worker—who had been praised when labor was scarce—was portrayed as a threat when labor was plentiful.

The political argument became brutally simple:

“Chinese workers are taking white men’s jobs and depressing wages.”

And the rallying cry of Denis Kearney and the Workingman’s Party:

“The Chinese must go”

The Barn

The Burlingame-Seward Treaty triggered a surge in Chinese immigration. Is it also true that the Panic of 1873, also known as The Long Depression, triggered the Chinese Exclusion Act? 

The Mack

Yes—with an important qualification. I think that is a very useful way to frame the story, provided we say the Panic of 1873 accelerated and politically empowered an exclusion movement that already existed, rather than literally caused it.

Your two bookends work rather well:

Burlingame-Seward helped open the gate wider.
The Panic of 1873 supplied much of the economic and political energy that eventually slammed it shut.

That last point is important. The Panic didn’t immediately close the gate. Quite the opposite: large numbers of Chinese continued arriving while economic conditions were deteriorating.

And that created an explosive combination:

More workers arriving + fewer jobs + falling wages + business failures + existing racial hostility.

The Barn

The Panic of 1873 certainly deserves more discussion?

The Mack

I’ll be here, looking forward to it.

Immigration: The Laws Change, the Demand Remains

Throughout American history, immigration policy has repeatedly changed direction. Employers encouraged foreign workers to come, political pressure eventually restricted their entry, and the economic demand for their labor often remained. From Chinese railroad workers in the 1860s to Mexican agricultural workers a century later, the pattern is remarkably familiar. Why does American immigration policy keep repeating itself?

The Barn

Set the scene for me: how was U.S. immigration governed in the decades prior to passage of the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, officially called the Immigration and Nationality Act?

LBJ signing Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965 at the foot of the Statue of Liberty

The Mack

The Immigration Act of 1924 established a national-origins quota system that heavily favored immigrants from Northern and Western Europe. The system was designed to preserve the existing ethnic composition of the United States.

As historian John Higham observed in his account of the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act: “Nativists during this period argued that the so-called new immigration from southern and eastern Europe was racially inferior to the ‘old immigration’ from northern and western Europe. It was therefore polluting the nation’s bloodstream.”

Under the quota system, immigrants from Britain and Germany received relatively generous allocations, while immigrants from Italy, Greece, and much of Eastern Europe faced severe restrictions.

Immigration from the Western Hemisphere was not subject to the national-origins numerical quotas. That meant Mexico and other Latin American countries operated under a different system from Europe and Asia.

Beginning in 1942, the United States had recruited temporary Mexican agricultural workers through the Bracero Program. Over its lifetime, the program recorded approximately 4.6 million worker admissions, including repeat admissions.

The Barn

So, during the lifetime of the Bracero program, 1942-1964 , more than 200,000 Mexicans crossed the border into the United States each year, primarily seeking jobs in agriculture?

The Mack

Over the program’s 22-year history, that averages roughly 209,000 admissions per year. Many Mexican workers participated in the program repeatedly, returning to Mexico when their contracts expired and coming back for subsequent agricultural seasons. Consequently, 4.6 million admissions does not mean 4.6 million different Mexicans immigrated to the United States.

The program began relatively modestly during World War II and expanded substantially during the 1950s. By the late 1950s, American agriculture had developed a system that accommodated approximately 400,000 temporary Mexican worker admissions annually.

The Barn

Seems like it parallels the Chinese Problem… open the gates wide and then a decade or two later slam it shut. From encouraging 400,000 annually to help in agriculture, to squeezing the flow down to 20,000 per year.

The Mack

There is a striking parallel, particularly when we look at the relationship between employers’ demand for immigrant labor and the political pressure to restrict immigration.

First, let’s get the numbers straight.

During the late 1950s, the United States was admitting approximately 400,000 Mexican agricultural workers annually through the Bracero Program.

Then:

  • 1964: The Bracero Program ended, eliminating that large-scale temporary agricultural labor channel.
  • 1965: Hart–Celler established a 120,000 annual ceiling for permanent immigration from the entire Western Hemisphere, effective in 1968.
  • 1976: Congress extended the 20,000-per-country limit to Mexico.

However, the 20,000 figure applied to certain categories of permanent immigration, not all Mexican workers entering the country. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens were exempt, and other temporary-worker provisions remained available.

So we cannot quite say Congress reduced total permitted Mexican immigration from 400,000 to 20,000. Those numbers measure different kinds of admissions.

The Bracero figures represent temporary worker admissions, including repeat admissions, while the later immigration limits concerned permanent immigration categories.

The Barn

Nevertheless, the combination of these changes substantially restricted Mexican labor migration, right? Can you compare these two immigration periods: the Chinese Problem and the Bracero program?

The Mack

Chinese Immigration and the Bracero Program: A Historical Comparison

CompareChinese immigrationMexican immigration
Period of labor recruitment1860s1942–1964
Principal employersRailroads, mining, agricultureAgriculture
Economic incentiveDemand for inexpensive, available laborDemand for seasonal agricultural labor
Government encouragementBurlingame Treaty, 1868Bracero agreements, beginning 1942
Political oppositionOrganized labor, anti-Chinese movementsLabor organizations, farmworker advocates, immigration restrictionists
Major restrictionChinese Exclusion Act, 1882Bracero termination, 1964; immigration ceilings, 1965–1976
Underlying economic demandDid not immediately disappearDid not immediately disappear

In both cases, the government initially facilitated access to foreign workers, and later restricted that access partly in response to concerns about domestic workers.

she loves me…

she loves me not…

The Barn

So, government restricts the supply of immigrant labor without eliminating the economic demand for it. I’m holding my breath, what happens next?

The Mack

In the Chinese case, employers adapted by seeking other workers, changing their operations, or continuing to employ Chinese workers already present.

In the Mexican case, employers still needed agricultural labor, while Mexican workers still had powerful economic incentives to seek employment in the United States.

One consequence was continued unauthorized migration, although other economic and policy factors also contributed.

And this brings us directly to IRCA in 1986.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Another Attempt at Reform

The Barn

IRCA was signed by Ronald Reagan in 1986, what did it propose to do?

The Mack

Twenty-two years after the Bracero Program ended, Congress was attempting to address an established unauthorized immigrant population by legalizing millions of people while penalizing employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers.

The Barn

IRCA has been described as one of those “three-legged stools.” Tell me about it.

The Mack

Sure, here are the three legs re IRCA.

  • Legalization (Amnesty): A path to legal status and eventual permanent residency for long-term unauthorized immigrants.
  • Employer Sanctions: For the first time in U.S. federal law, it became illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, or refer for a fee unauthorized workers.
  • Border Enforcement: Increased funding and resources for the U.S. Border Patrol and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

The Barn

It turns out one of those legs was so weak, there was never a chance it would work.

The Mack

Yes, subsequent policy analyses—such as evaluations by the Migration Policy Institute—noted that the stool wobbled or failed over time because employer sanctions were difficult to enforce consistently.

There is a recurring historical tension here: immigration policy can restrict the legal supply of workers more readily than it can eliminate the economic incentives that attract them.

The Barn

Maybe there is something about homo sapiens, the smart ape. Perhaps it is time for a deep dive into our past.

The Mack

That should be fun, and hopefully informative.